

**N C C A P**

**F**

**A: I**

**A 2012**

:vivideconomics



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## **1. A**

AFD	Agence Française de Développement
AfDB	African Development Bank
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CERs	certified emission reductions
COP	Conference of the Parties
CSR	corporate social responsibility
DFID	Department for International Development
EU ETS	European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GW	Gigawatt
IFC	International Finance Corporation
KCCAP	Kenyan Climate Change Action Plan
KES	Kenyan shilling
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
MDBs	Multilateral development banks
MW	Megawatt
NCCRS	National Climate Change Response Strategy
RDBs	Regional development banks
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USD	United States Dollars

## **2. I**

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Climate Change Response Strateg<sup>1</sup> . The initial anal sis ithin the National


### 3.

This chapter provides an overview of the current climate finance landscape, and Ken assesses existing interactions with it. It divides the analysis into international and domestic sources of finance.

#### 3.1 International

Figure A1 below provides a useful way of depicting the international climate finance landscape. The left hand side depicts different sources of climate finance, e.g. bilateral agencies, multilateral agencies, the private sector and philanthropy; the middle column specifies the financial instruments provided by these different parties; and the final column shows the activities that are supported by these financial resources. In other words, climate finance flows from bilateral sources account for around 20 per cent of climate finance flows, around 4 per cent of total climate finance is provided as grants and 96 per cent of climate finance flows are directed towards mitigation.

Figure A1: International climate finance flows, 2009-2010




Source: UNEP (2011) *Trends in International Climate Finance*. Adapted from UNEP (2011).

A number of key features can be seen from this figure:

- Private capital flows account for a significant proportion of international climate finance flows. Access to this source of finance will be crucial if Kenya is to finance its ambitions.
- Consistent with this, the majority of financial resources are provided as either non-concessional debt or equity.
- Globally, the vast majority of climate finance is flowing towards mitigation; less than 5 per cent is used to finance adaptation. This is inconsistent with Kenya's needs: the NCCRS has a much more even split of required financial resources between adaptation and mitigation.

The two following sub-chapters go into more detail on public and private international climate finance.

F A2:



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R , K ,

- In terms of bilateral development partners, it is estimated that projects and programmes valuing around \$1.4 billion are currently supported by bilateral agencies in Kenya. The AFD has the largest programme in Kenya (with projects valuing more than \$400m) with the Danish International Development Agency, the Swedish



International Development Partners (IDP) and DFID and other international development partners supported the activities.

- Multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the African Development Bank have climate change activities in Kenya. The World Bank has been able to disburse funds to Kenya relatively easily through the Kenya Development Bank.
- In terms of climate change, the Scaling Up Renewable Energy Programme has been an investment in Kenya around \$25 million. The programme has been disbursed through the Special Climate Change Fund, the Global Environment Facility Trust Fund and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Readiness Fund. All these resources have all disbursed to Kenya and a proportion of around \$300 million worth of resources have been disbursed from climate funds to projects in Kenya.
- Of the total \$2.3 billion invested in Kenya by development agencies, roughly \$920 million has been in the energy sector and \$600 million in water and sanitation. Forestry, agriculture and coastal areas account for most of the rest.
- The amount of funds devoted to mitigation and adaptation is roughly equal, with adaptation accounting for slightly more, as is appropriate for the Kenyan situation.

H ,

As the World Bank's World Development Report<sup>6</sup> notes:

**K**. Although Kenya has been relatively successful at attracting international public support, this has come at the cost of fragmentation. There are at least 15 different agencies supporting climate change activities and programmes in Kenya, each carrying their own administrative costs and with different rules and processes concerning both the extent, and means, of engagement with the Government of Kenya. There is little evidence of the pooling of resources. Although the Climate Change Coordination Group provides a forum for harmonisation, it is informal and not legally binding.

**K** : at the global level, the likely emergence of the Green Climate Fund (GCF), which may facilitate consolidation of the existing array of climate funds, and, at the national level, a greater interest in the role of national climate funds to manage the flows of international public climate finance within countries.

It was launched at the 17<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Parties (COP 17) in Durban in 2011 with the intention of making a significant and ambitious contribution to combatting, and adapting to, climate change. It is plausible that, over time, this will supersede the existing proliferation of different funds; indeed, the Climate Investment Funds contain an explicit sunset clause linked to the establishment of the GCF. A further key feature of the GCF is a commitment to provide balanced funding between

adaptation and mitigation, which could imply a different allocation to that currently achieved globally (as shown in Figure A1).

N

• The aim of such funds is to provide a centralised pool of resources that can be allocated to individual projects and programmes according to a common, nationally-relevant set of priorities and criteria. Bangladesh, Brazil and Indonesia are among the countries that have developed a national funding entity. By moving funding decisions to be made at a national level, it is expected that climate change funding will be better placed to address or respond to developing country concerns or priorities (such as formulated in the Kenya Climate Change Action Plan). By reducing the multiplicity of different procedures and processes associated with acquiring funding from different sources, there can also be a reduction in transaction costs.

for the Green Climate Fund states that “[t]he GCF is a multilateral instrument of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that is designed to assist developing countries in their efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change.” [REDACTED] (emphasis added) [REDACTED]. The GCF is also committed to pursue country-led approaches and promote and strengthen engagement at the country level through involving relevant institutions and stakeholders.

$$\mathbf{K} \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{N} \\ \mathbf{K} \end{pmatrix} = \mathbf{C} \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{A} \\ \mathbf{B} \end{pmatrix} \quad (1)$$

### 3.1.2 P

As shown in Figure A1, the best estimates suggest that around 60 per cent of international climate finance currently comes from the private sector, and the Copenhagen Accord commitments explicitly note that in pursuing the \$100 billion target private sources of finance will be used. As the Report of the Secretary-General's High Level Advisor Group on Climate Change Financing notes: *Essential to the achievement of the target is the mobilization of private capital*.<sup>9</sup> The are particularly relevant for (and in practice focused on) mitigation.

## K

A . As part of the consultation exercise among international investors undertaken as part of the FiFit

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. Carbon market activities are (predominantly) private sector projects where it can be demonstrated that the project results in a deviation from a business-as-usual level of emissions. The deviation in emissions can be crystallised as a credit that

- Public engagement with sources of private finance.

As explained in section E of the Investment Climate for Climate Investment, a key element of financing the Climate Change Action Plan will be to introduce reforms consistent with these ideas, so as to catalyse greater (international) private sector investment.


## 3.2 N

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K  
the current state, and key areas of debate, in relation to these resources. As above, we distinguish between public and private sources.

### 3.2.1 P

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KE 37 ( \$450 ).  
This is derived from some 30 to 35 ongoing projects and activities. As Figure A3 shows, the bulk of these resources, around 45 per cent, are in the energy sector, with forestry and land-use projects and water and sanitation activities accounting for a further 20 per cent of resources each. Consistent with this, the Minister of Energy and Minister of Environment

F A3: G K



S : KIPPRA a ASI

### 3.2.2 P

K

- , - , and it can build on the strong base already established. The Ken an private sector is estimated to have invested close to \$150 million in renewable energy projects alone to date, a figure that rises to in excess of \$1.2 billion if the Kenya Electricity Generating Company and the Kenya Tea Development Authority parastatals are included. Much of this investment has been focused on geothermal activity, but relative to international investors the Ken an private sector has also shown interest in other renewable technologies, especially small hydro and biomass.

K C C K A P . It will require a supportive investment climate with clear and transparent regulation and well-designed policy incentives. Complementing this, the judicious use of public finance can help to leverage Ken an private sector investment. This can build on the experience Kenya already has through such models as the Geothermal Development Corporation, a 100 percent public-owned company which is absorbing the early stage drilling risks of geothermal power production.

## 4. F C C A P

### K C C A P


. It builds on the overall context provided in the previous chapter and shows how the key challenges can be overcome. Further details are provided in the four subsequent sections (B-E). The extensive research and analysis underpinning this analysis is also annexed to this report.

### K

. The strategy has been developed over a series of 9 months through a review of background literature, quantitative data analysis (for instance, on carbon market trends) and analysis of international precedents and experience. A crucial part of the work has been extensive engagement with Kenyan and international experts: over 70 experts have been engaged as part of this work. The relevant institutions consulted on are listed at the end of each section. In addition, the strategic insights and guidance provided by the Thematic Working Group (a body of Kenyan experts convened specially for this work) have been invaluable.

. Earlier chapters in this section identified that climate finance sources can be helpfully divided into international and domestic, and, within this, public and private. The analysis and actions are intended to increase the scale and effectiveness of all four of these sources. This is displayed in Figure 4.4. It shows the different forms of climate finance – public and private, domestic and international – and how the recommendations cover all of these sources of climate finance. Each box represents a section and associated set of recommendations with the chart showing the extent to which they relate to public or private, domestic or international resources. For example, the absorptive capacity paper relates to domestic and international public resources. As such, the recommendations form a coherent package of actions intended to maximise the flows of climate finance into and within Kenya.

F A4:



S : V E

## B

## K N C F

It is intended that this could become the primary vehicle for receiving and disbursing international climate finance. In doing so, it could aim to overcome the challenges of fragmentation associated with the current disbursement of international public climate finance in Kenya, and build an institution within Kenya with core climate finance expertise. This expertise, together with the adoption of robust governance arrangements, safeguards and a clear set of funding priorities (the KCAP) should help strengthen Kenya's position as a credible and attractive destination for international public climate finance flows. The Fund could also become a vehicle for providing public finance that might leverage greater amounts of private finance from both Kenyan and overseas investors. The Government of Kenya could also commit public resources to this Fund.

## C

## N

## C

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The process by which the government manages funds from development agencies (as well as its own revenue) has a major bearing on the speed of funds disbursement to implementing agencies (e.g. line ministries or NGOs), and consequently on the effectiveness of project implementation. The section identifies that the absorption rate of climate finance, and development finance more broadly, is low. This is due to a range of factors, from budgeting and funding challenges on the part of the Treasury and line ministries, to the non-alignment of government and development partner fiscal policies and procedures, to the lack of prioritisation of climate change within the budget. It makes a series of recommendations to improve absorptive capacity including continuing improvements to the government's PFM system, the creation of a climate change code in the budget, the standardisation of government and development agency fiscal practices, and improvements to the modalities of project implementation. All of these will have a direct bearing on the full design and establishment of the National Climate Fund.

## D

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As referenced above, and discussed in more detail in the second paper, external factors mean that Kenya's access to carbon finance will be limited in the short to medium term. This demands a strategic response: balancing the greater need for action resulting from the tough external environment against the fact that the external environment makes an action more risky. The paper makes a series of recommendations consisting of both institutional reforms, e.g. capacity building of the Designated National Authority and the creation of a modest unit tasked with promoting and marketing Kenyan carbon market activity, as well as broader policy reform options.

## E,

## K

This investment climate will be key to unlocking the resources of the private sector, both in Kenya and overseas, so as to move Kenya onto a low-carbon climate resilient growth trajectory. The paper identifies that, despite Kenya's strengths, there are a number of areas in which the investment climate is hindering private sector engagement. This includes a project development process that is long and complex, a policy environment that is either deficient (in the case of renewable energy) or non-existent (in the case of energy efficiency), a finance community that does not yet fully meet the needs of project developers and a lack of technical capacity among project developers and financial institutions. It identifies a series of targeted interventions to overcome these weaknesses including the creation of a one-stop



renewable energy; improvements to the Feed-in Tariff regime; the development of a national energy efficiency policy and greater co-ordination of technical assistance programmes. The implementation of these interventions could be an important complement to the Kenya National Climate Fund and carbon trading platform.

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<sup>1</sup> Government of Kenya, National Climate Change Response Strategy, (April 2010)

<sup>2</sup> UNFCCC, Draft decision -/CP.15 Copenhagen Accord (18<sup>th</sup> December 2009) [ (De) 4 (c) 5 ¶ 15 (2010)]